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JAY M. VOGELSON*
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Holy warriors in first-century Palestine publicly
slit the throats of Roman citizens and those who supported Roman rule. Deliberately spec-
tacular terrorist acts designed to upset the political order and influence a wide audience
have occurred through the centuries. In more recent times, the terrorist assassination in
1914 of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand contributed to the start of World War I. The
terrorism we now are experiencing put its foot in the water in 1968, when the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine accomplished the first terrorist hijacking of a com-
mercial aircraft.
While other countries have experienced terrorism for a long time and the United States
experienced a number of aircraft hijackings in the 1970s, the scope of international terror-
ism increased significantly in the 1980s. We remember, for instance, Pan Am flight 103
that was destroyed over Lockerbie, Scotland and the 1985 bombing of an Air India jet. We
also remember the 1983 suicide bombings at the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, the Khobar
Towers explosion in Saudi Arabia, the 1993 attempt to destroy the World Trade Center
and the 1998 destruction of U.S. Embassies in Africa.
Although the United States had suffered from terrorism before September 11,2001, the
enormity of the massive murders and destruction of that day galvanized the American peo-
ple and our government. From that day, it rightly became a national objective to root out
those capable of international terrorism, to protect the homeland, and to mobilize the
international community to put an end to this criminal and destabilizing conduct.
I. What was in Place on September 11, 2001
The countries of the world long have been engaged in developing international agree-
ments to provide for peace and security. These have taken the form of regional agreements
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such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization of American
States (OAS). They also include the collective security measures contained in the United
Nations Charter, and in the powers granted to the Security Council to maintain interna-
tional peace and security according to the principles and purposes of the United Nations.
In addition, through the United Nations, there has been a continuing focus on international
terrorism since the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Com-
mitted Onboard Aircraft.2 Primarily through the specialized agencies of the United Na-
tions, principally the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (AEA), a
network of international agreements were put in force) The United States has not approved
conventions on bioterrorism and land mines. There are two conventions of particular note
that the United States has not ratified, namely, the 1997 Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings4 and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism.' Both of these conventions have been signed by the United States and submitted
to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. President Bush announced support for
the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
These various agreements have had a mixed history. Some have been more effective than
others, but, in the main, the U.N. specialized agencies involved in implementing many of
these agreements have been as effective as one realistically could expect. Quite a number
of national laws and international agreements touch issues relevant to terrorism but none
have terrorist conduct as the prime subject. These include use of force agreements, national
and international tribunals, extradition, weapons control, international smuggling of ma-
terials, people and arms transfers, immigration, and human rights to name a few. Terrorist
conduct frequently has been dealt with as criminal conduct in which law enforcement
agencies and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) have played
leading parts.
It is evident that prior to September 11 the world community was not focused on the
need to eradicate international terrorism. Isolated events brought attention, sometimes over
long duration as in the case of Pan Am 103 and the continuing attention to Iraq; however,
the focus was elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s. During that time, the Cold War ended,
the states of the former Soviet Union emerged as independent countries, and world trade
dominated.
1. All of the United Nations conventions and other documents referred to in this article are available at the
U.N. Web site, http://www.un.org.
2. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft, Sept. 14,1963,20 U.S.T.
2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
3. The conventions to which the United States is a party include the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft; 1970 Hague Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft; 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation;
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents; 1979 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; 1979 Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation; 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.
4. G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 72d mtg, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1997).
5. G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/
109 (2000).
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The 1980s began a two-decade period in which the United States was less interested
than in earlier times in developing multilateral agreements and supporting the United Na-
tions and other international institutions. There are consequences to that approach. Among
those consequences is the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and
the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; other mechanisms
for dealing with terrorism that might have been pursued and put in place were allowed to
flounder. The U.N. dues dispute, and the reluctance of the Senate to take up multinational
agreements also deflected attention.
II. Post-September 1 th Acceleration
The unprecedented devastation of the September 11 th attack exposed the vulnerability
of population centers in the United States and around the world. It also exposed the in-
adequacy of past policies and practices in dealing with terrorists. Whatever role prior in-
ternational agreements and U.N. specialized agencies may have played in containing ter-
rorism in the past, the destruction of the World Trade Center and the murder of so many
people brought home the conclusion that individual states and the world community had
not put in place means to control terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks. It also became
evident that there was consequences to inadequate policies in the United States and around
the world and those consequences now must be reversed. No longer can terrorists be har-
bored. No longer may states allow terrorists to fester. No longer can there be a failure to
deal effectively and comprehensively with this international menace.
A great deal can, and must, be done by individual states. Terrorist groups and training
activities have local centers, use local facilities, and garner local support. Dealing with this
is the first obligation of individual states. It is the first line of defense. Rooting out terrorists,
especially those with international destructive capability, necessarily requires more than any
state can itself accomplish. The extensive use of the Internet by al Qaeda, arms proliferation
and access to biological agents, and the ease of fund transfers, for instance, requires con-
certed action by many states. Globalization is not limited to business. The tools of glob-
alization are available for terrorists to use as well. As a consequence, no state's unilateral
effort is adequate. There are more than twenty militant terrorist groups, including the
networks of al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Harakatoul-Mujahedeen, Abu Sayyaf
Group, and Aum Shinrikyo. The centers of these networks are in the Middle East, Central
Asia, Japan, and the Philippines. Smaller, but no less dangerous, groups operate in the
United States, Europe, and many other places. Some states are said to sponsor terrorism. 6
Others have been considered havens for terrorism.7 Still others, for political or other rea-
sons, have avoided confronting terrorist recruitment and training in their midst.
In addition to taking necessary unilateral action, the United States assembled a supportive
coalition of other states to pursue al Qaeda.8 Multinational action also accelerated at the
6. Those designated as state sponsors of terrorism include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and
Sudan.
7. The havens for terrorism have included Afghanistan, Yemen, Lebanon, Somalia, Indonesia, Columbia,
and the Philippines.
8. The coalition states include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, China, Egypt, India, Japan, Jordan, other
Central Asian states, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Western Europe, United Kingdom,
and Uzbekistan.
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United Nations. This action included a bold Security Council resolution on the obligations
of states, the completion of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Respon-
sibility, the pursuit of a U.N. terrorism agreement, and accelerated efforts to put the in-
ternational criminal court (ICC) in place. The most important document condemning ter-
rorism and offering a multinational plan of action is Security Council Resolution 1373,
adopted on September 28, 2001. 9
Security Council Resolution 1373 is an extremely important declaration. For the first
time, through the Security Council, the United Nations called on all Member States to
take action against terrorists and terrorist groups. The resolution calls on all states to:
" Find ways to accelerate and intensify operational information exchanges, particularly con-
cerning actions or movements of terrorists and their networks; forged and falsified travel
documents; arms, explosive and sensitive material traffic; use of the various communica-
tion technologies; and threats resulting from possession of weapons of mass destruction
by terrorist groups;
" Exchange information and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent
terrorist acts;
" Especially through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, cooperate to
prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and to take action against those who perpetrate such
acts;
" Become parties as immediately as possible to the international conventions and protocols
concerning terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism; and
" Increase cooperation and fully implement the various conventions and protocols con-
cerning terrorism and Security Council Resolutions 126910 (1999) and 136811 (2001)."
It is highly significant that Security Council Resolution 1373 also recognized a connec-
tion between international terrorism and "transnational" organized crime, drug trafficking,
money laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and unlawful movement and transportation of
nuclear, chemical, biological, and other potentially dangerous substances. It further em-
phasized the need to increase coordination efforts at all levels to respond to the challenge
to international security.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Security Council Resolution 1373 was that the
Security Council did not simply adopt the resolution and move on to other things. The
resolution specifically retains jurisdiction in the Security Council, which formed a com-
mittee to monitor the resolution's implementation. It set a deadline of ninety days for all
9. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
10. Security Council Resolution 1269 called on all states to cooperate with each other, especially through
bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, to prevent and suppress terrorism, protect their na-
tionals and other persons against terrorism and to bring to justice those who perpetrate terrorist acts; prevent
and suppress the preparation and financing of any acts of terrorism within their territories; deny safe havens
to those who plan, finance or commit terrorist acts; prevent those who participate in terrorist acts from securing
asylum; and exchange information necessary to prevent the commission of terrorist acts and to cooperate on
all administrative and judicial matters related to that purpose. S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4053d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999).
11. Security Council Resolution 1368 was adopted on September 12, 2001. It condemned the September
1Ith attacks and called on all states to work together to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and
sponsors. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
12. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 9.
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states to report on the steps taken to implement the resolution, and it directed the com-
mittee to promptly submit a work program in consultation with the Secretary-General that
delineates specific tasks in the manner of implementation.
This resolution has legal significance, having been adopted within the jurisdiction and
pursuant to the powers of the Security Council. It was adopted by unanimous vote. We
must bear in mind, however, that this resolution, strong as it is, does not have an enforce-
ment mechanism. As such, the resolution, while it has moral and legal restraints, has power
only to the extent that the United Nations collectively decides to require implementation
and imposes penalties on States that demonstrably do not comply. It is noted that the
permanent members voting for the resolution" reflect a wide diversity of views and national
goals. Beginning in January 2002, two-year membership terms on the Security Council
began for Bulgaria and the Syrian Arab Republic. While the Charter of the United Nations
requires all Member States to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, we know
from experience that various states will do so in different ways, some more forcefully than
others, and some not at all.
In recognizing inherent limitations of Security Council Resolution enforcement, Reso-
lution 1373 provides a critical basis for cooperative action. Paragraph 3(c) of the resolution
specifically calls on all States to: "Cooperate particularly through bilateral and multilateral
arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action
against perpetrators of such acts."14 This provision allows and encourages formal and in-
formal "arrangements" on a bilateral or multilateral basis to take specific action directed
toward preventing or suppressing terrorist acts and against those who perpetrate terrorist
acts. In addition to the right of self-defense provided in the Charter and international law,
this resolution provides another legal basis for cooperative arrangements between states to
do what is required to suppress, apprehend, and punish terrorists.
One of the other measures affecting the struggle with international terrorism is, after a
number of years of work, the completion by the International Law Commission of draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (November
2001)." It is perhaps an anomaly that previously the United Nations has not adopted a
codification and an updating of international law on this important subject. Since early
times, principles of state responsibility have been embedded in international law. While
many principles are of long standing, others are not, and many principles have been subject
to conflicting interpretations and points of view.
It has taken quite a long time for the Draft Articles on State Responsibility to be com-
pleted. The International Law Commission selected the topic in 1949 as being a subject
suitable for codification, and the General Assembly approved the undertaking in 1953.16
Studies have been undertaken since 1964, and over the decades reports and studies were
developed on various aspects of the topic. The International Law Commission to the Gen-
eral Assembly, which will either adopt the articles or note the conclusion of the work, will
submit the final Draft Articles, adopted in November 2001. While it is unclear at this point
what the legal significance will be of the Draft Articles, they will no doubt be an important
place of reference. For that reason the Articles have significance.
13. The permanent members of the Security Council are the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United
States, Peoples Republic of China, and France.
14. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 9.
15. G.A. Res. 56/10, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
16. GA. Res. 799(vml), U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1954).
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The rules governing state responsibility obviously were not developed with terrorism as
a focus. The breadth and unusual scope of the rules, however, makes application to the
present circumstances especially useful. The purpose of the Articles is to codify and provide
for the progressive development of basic rules of international law about state responsibility
for their internationally wrongful acts. The rules do not define "internationally wrongful
acts," but rather, are secondary rules by which a state would be considered responsible for
wrongful acts or omissions and the legal consequences that flow from such conduct. These
rules do not deal with the function of primary rules of substantive international law, either
customary or conventional. The rules also include provisions concerning countermeasures,
and the rule of proportionality is adopted.
The rules adopt the proposition in article 1 that: "Every internationally wrongful act of
a State entails the international responsibility of that State." 7 Internationally wrongful acts
occur when either an action or omission is attributable to the state by substantive inter-
national law and is a breach of an international obligation of the state. It is important that
article 3 specifically provides that an internationally wrongful act is governed by interna-
tional law alone and the characterization of the act or omission is not affected by domestic
law.8 Consequently, it might be said that if a state is a party to an international agreement,
such as the U.N. Charter for example, an act or omission of the state in violation of the
Charter would be subject to redress, even though domestic law may not fully recognize the
Charter obligation or provide means for its implementation. This could raise international
obligations to a new level that, under local law, might require legislation to effect.
It is noteworthy that the Articles provide a wide range of means by which acts or
omissions may be attributed to a state. These cover the conduct of all state organs, regardless
of whether the body exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other function and re-
gardless of the position in the state organization or the character of the body of the central
government or of any territorial unit within the state. Attribution also may result from
conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority, even if actual
authority is exceeded or instructions are contravened. Conduct directed or controlled by
the state is covered, as is the conduct of persons "exercising elements of the governmental
authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as
to call for the exercise of those elements of authority." 9 It further is provided that conduct
of an insurrectional or other movement may be attributed to the state if the movement
becomes the new government, and obviously any conduct that a state acknowledges or
adopts as its own is attributed to it. These rules of attribution are broadly stated. Because
the rules of responsibility cover both affirmative acts and omissions, the coupling of state
responsibility with the attribution rules necessarily provides a broad basis to hold a state
responsible for its international obligations. This may have far reaching implications; for
instance, application of these rules might make the government of Afghanistan responsible
for the conduct of al Qaeda. In view of Security Council Resolution 1373 and the obligation
of U.N. Member States under the Charter, it certainly can be argued that a state may be
considered responsible for conduct and omissions to act that do not comply with its Charter
obligations. In the Articles pertaining to redress, damages are provided as well as the rec-
17. G.A. Res. 56/1O, supra note 15, art. 1.
18. Id. art. 3.
19. See id. art. 9.
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ognition that countermeasures may be taken so long as they are proportional. Chapter II
provides remedies that include forms of reparation, restitution, compensation, satisfaction,
interest and contribution to the injury.20 Applying these standards could impose substantial
and indeed harsh remedies against a state that fails to fulfill or affirmatively acts in contra-
vention of its international obligations.
In addition to the measures discussed above, the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General
Assembly in October 2001 published the report of its Working Group, which was consti-
tuted to develop measures to eliminate international terrorism." The work of this com-
mittee began in December 1996 but accelerated in recent years. The release of the Draft
Measures in October 2001 obviously reflects changed circumstances and a new urgency.
Most of the provisions of the Draft Measures are generally satisfactory to the members
of the Working Group. They were in the main taking from prior agreements and include
a wide range of measures requiring states to adopt measures establishing criminal offenses
under domestic law, providing for appropriate penalties, providing means for law enforce-
ment cooperation, trial, and extradition.
Article 2 is the one large bracket article to which many of the other articles refer. Article
2 would contain a definition of terrorism and terroristic conduct. No definition has been
agreed upon, reflecting a wide variety of points of view about how terrorism should be
defined. The Working Group agreed in article 5 that state parties to the convention should
adopt domestic legislation to ensure that criminal acts covered by the convention could not
be considered justifiable under domestic law because of "political, philosophical, ideologi-
cal, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar" reasons." Having settled on this article 5
provision, potentially highly contentious, one certainly wonders about the failure of the
Working Group to come to agreement on the definition of terrorism and terroristic acts.
One also wonders how effective a convention would be when there is not a common un-
derstanding on this central definition point.
In fact, there are a number of competing definitions of "terrorism." For instance, the
U.S. Department of State considers terrorism to be "premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience."23 A former deputy chief of the CIA's
Counterterrorist Center says terrorism consists of four key elements:
1. It is premeditated - planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage.
2. It is political - not criminal, like the violence that groups such as the mafia use to get money,
but designed to change the existing political order.
3. It is aimed at civilians - not at military targets or combat-ready troops.
4. It is carried out by subnational groups - not by the army of a country.24
On the other hand, the 1999 Convention of the Organisation of The Islamic Conference
on Combating International Terrorism put it this way:
20. Id. ch. I.
21. Measures to eliminate international terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm.,
56th Sess., Agenda Item 166, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9 (2001).
22. Id. art. 5.
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'Terrorism' means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or inten-
tions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terror-
izing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honour, freedoms, security
or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards
or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or
threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent
States.25
In contrast, the Coordinator of the U.N. Working Group proposed the following
definition:
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by
any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State
or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the
environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of this
article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss,
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any
act.26
Adding to the confusion is a subject of exceptions that would be covered by article 18,
which is similarly bracketed because of the inability of the Working Group to reach agree-
ment. This is an area where the political views of parties are stumbling blocks. For instance,
the Islamic Group, on November 7, 2001, proposed excluding activities of parties during
armed conflicts including situations of foreign occupation. Depending on one's point of
view, civilian bombings by Hezbollah and others in the Middle East or elsewhere might
not be covered by the Convention. As a consequence of the inability of the Working Group
to reach a consensus on the definition and exclusion articles, there remains doubt as to the
future of the Convention, both in terms of reaching agreement on the text, as well as the
manner of implementation.
In this context, it is appropriate to mention the International Criminal Court (ICC).
While the statute of the ICC27 was not drafted with terrorism as a principal focus, there
can be little doubt that terrorist conduct comes within the article 5 crimes designated within
the ICC's jurisdiction, namely, the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and the crime of aggression.28 These crimes are further defined in articles 6-8.19 These
broad definitions vest the ICC with jurisdiction over the type of conduct pursued by ter-
rorist activity. Article 2 5 specifically provides the ICC with jurisdiction over natural persons
who commit crimes within its jurisdiction.30 The statute applies to all persons without
25. Convention of the Organization of The Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism,
July 1, 1999, Islamic Conf. Foreign Ministers, 26th Sess., Res. 59/26-P, Annex, available at http://www.oic-
un.org/26icfm/c.html.
26. See Report of the Working Group, mpra note 21, art. 2.
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9* (1999), availabkathttp:/
/www.un.org/law/ICC/statute.
28. Id. art. 5.
29. Id. arts. 6-8.
30. Id. art. 25.
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regard to official capacity. The ICC consequently has jurisdiction over government officials
as well as individuals. It is specifically provided in article 27 that any special procedural
rules or immunities that might otherwise attach to the official capacity of a person, under
national or international law, will not prevent the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over
that person." Some questions arising under the law of Chile in England in the extradition
case involving General Pinochet might not have relevance in an ICC case.
While the ICC has not yet come into being, the process of its formation is accelerating.
European states particularly are advancing the acceptance process. At this writing, forty-
eight states have ratified the statute, which will go into force when the sixtieth instrument
of ratification is deposited. Meanwhile, rules of procedure are being adopted.
While the United States at this point is not prepared to ratify the ICC's statue, the Court
very well could come into being without the United States as a party since the requisite
number of ratifications have been deposited. It should be noted that the ICC's jurisdiction
might not be significantly affected by the absence of the United States as a party. Since the
ICC likely has jurisdiction over terrorist conduct, it is foreseeable that the Court could
become an important forum in bringing terrorists to justice. The Court could avoid extra-
dition problems with national courts and, as an international judicial body, could gain wide-
spread acceptance, perhaps in a manner similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia.
M. Unintended Consequences
The United States quite correctly is pursuing its right of self-defense. Striking at, and
bringing to justice, those who committed atrocities against people in this country is what
the circumstances require. No doubt the administrations that took less vigorous action
against terrorist acts in the 1980s and 1990s thought what they did was appropriate at the
time. No doubt our assistance to Iraq in its war against Iran, or the arming and training of
Arab fighters and other Mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union were well-
intentioned policies. Perhaps all of these policies were right for the times in which they
were developed and pursued.
Unintended consequences frequently bedevil complicated circumstances. Rebellions, in-
surrections, religious and nonreligious strife, and many other circumstances in which ter-
rorists function present difficult circumstances. The reactions of states to terrorist acts vary
widely, depending on many internal matters and political forces. It is not easy to determine
the right mix of unilateral and multilateral action, or how hard or how far to push a country
that has terrorists in its midst.
We are at the beginning of a concerted effort to protect not just the people of the United
States but also others in the world from international terrorism. We are not yet at the point
where we can see the consequences, much less the unintended consequences of our efforts.
Questions, however, do come to the fore, such as how and to what extent other countries
may become destabilized, who will take justified or questionable unilateral action in the
name of combating terrorism, how forcing other countries to make hard domestic choices
will affect those countries, who will be prepared to carry on the struggle and for how long,
31. Id. art. 27.
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and what is the proper balance of forces and resources to commit to the struggle. There
may not be any real security but only relative security. For the United States, we must
reconsider if, and to what extent, we are prepared to work in multilateral arrangements and
to participate once again in U.N. agencies such as UNESCO (which deals in education,
culture and scientific matters primarily in the undeveloped and developing world). We must
ask what aid we will provide to the undeveloped and developing world so that its residents
live at a level where it becomes their interest to prevent terrorism from existing in their
land.
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